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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently several countries have implemented explicit deposit insurance systems. In most countries 
the adoption of an explicit deposit insurance system followed a banking crisis. This paper 
examines the impact of demographic, social, and political factors on the presence of an explicit 
deposit insurance system in a country. Moreover, for a subset of countries with explicit deposit 
insurance system we try to identify demographic, political, economic, and financial factors that 
affect the level of deposit insurance coverage. The findings suggest that life expectancy and 
political rights are related to whether an explicit deposit insurance system is in place or not. For 
countries with explicit deposit insurance systems the level of income, the importance of the 
banking sector within the financial system, and the development of domestic banking sector have a 
significant impact on the level of deposit insurance coverage level. The level of income, deposit 
money bank assets to GDP ratio, bank overhead costs to total assets ratio, presence of co-
insurance, and type of administration are statistically significant in explaining differences in the 
level of coverage among countries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ecently we have witnessed a series of banking crises around the world. Banking crises have occurred 
in developed and developing countries. Prominently, the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian financial 
crisis of 1998 have involved banking crises including bank insolvency. Systematic bank insolvencies 
involve huge costs to the banks, their customers, and to the governments. The consequences include the disruption 
of bank lending and the payments system as well as a reduction in investment and economic activity. Further, in 
addition to depositors’ losses, governments incur large costs to remedy a banking crisis.  
 
 To prevent financial and banking crisis all countries have financial safety nets in place, including explicit 
and implicit deposit insurance, bank regulation and supervision, central bank lender of last resorts facilities, and 
bank insolvency resolution procedures. Deposit insurance has become a tool often used by governments in an effort 
to ensure the stability of the banking system and to protect bank depositors from bank failures. Although more and 
more countries have adopted explicit deposit insurance schemes, risk taking associated with moral hazard behavior 
by banks contributes to the fragility of the banking system (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Under many 
deposit insurance schemes, if the government covers a significant portion of the depositors’ losses, it weakens 
market discipline and creates an incentive for depository institutions to undertake undue risks, leading to greater 
systematic instability.  
 
 In recent years a significant number of developing countries have also implemented deposit insurance. 
Moreover, as Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2005) point out, every country has a de facto implicit deposit 
insurance scheme in place since governments get pressed for relief at the breakout of a large systematic banking 
crisis. According to Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005) as of 2003, there are 87 countries with explicit 
deposit insurance in place including 30 high income countries, 17 upper middle income countries, 30 lower middle 
income countries, and 10 low income countries.  Geographically, countries with explicit deposit insurance in place 
are primarily located in Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Furthermore, among countries with 
R 
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explicit deposit insurance we find that the schemes vary significantly from country to country in coverage and 
safeguards. The differences might be explained by political, demographic, social, economic, and financial factors. 
Deposit insurance affects not only banks’ depositors, but also shareholders, creditors, bank managers, the deposit 
insurance agency, the government, and taxpayers. 
 
This paper looks at the determinants of deposit insurance coverage throughout the world. First, our goal is 
to identify the factors that might have an effect on the existence of explicit deposit insurance systems throughout the 
world. Second, for a set of countries with an explicit deposit insurance system in place we investigate how cross-
country differences including deposit insurance design features as well as social, political, demographic, economic 
and financial characteristics relate to the amount of deposit insurance coverage. The analysis will use international 
data sets on deposit insurance recently constructed by the World Bank and various sources that enclose social, 
political, demographic and other characteristics for countries across the world. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 There is a large amount of theoretical research on deposit insurance design; however, there is not much 
empirical evidence to support theory and hypotheses. Most of the conducted empirical work uses U.S. bank data. 
Examining deposit insurance on an international level has been hard due to the absence of data on deposit insurance 
across countries. Recently, this gap was addressed by a few studies. 
 
The study by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) presents cross-country evidence on market discipline. In 
an examination of deposit insurance in over 50 countries, they find that explicit deposit insurance systems weaken 
market discipline as evidenced by lower interest expense and reduced sensitivity of interest payments to risk. They 
also find that market discipline declines with higher coverage levels, coverage of interbank deposits, ex-ante 
funding, and government sponsored funds.  Market discipline is increased in cases with co-insurance, coverage of 
foreign currency denominated deposits, and private administration of funds.   
 
Cull, Senbet, and Sorge (2005) address a similar issue. They examine the impact of explicit deposit 
insurance on financial stability and development. They gather data over a longer period of time and find that the 
same explicit deposit insurance programs will have different effects depending on the general institutional setting 
and environment. Based on deposit insurance design features, they construct two indices: generosity of coverage to 
depositors and entry hurdles representing the requirements imposed upon member banks. The empirical results show 
that generous deposit insurance schemes in countries without proper regulatory oversight have a negative effect on 
financial stability and development. In addition, insurance premium requirements on member banks, have little 
effect on financial development. To explain this fact they find that in most countries included in the sample, deposit 
insurance is under priced. Thus, the low insurance premiums do not constrain banks’ risk-taking incentives. 
 
 In contrast to the literature that focuses on how deposit insurance relates to the financial systems, Laeven 
(2005) applies a political economy framework to explain cross-country differences in deposit insurance design. 
Laeven looks at differences in coverage across countries focusing on political, regulatory, and institutional setup. In 
his model, the dependent variable is the level of coverage divided by GDP per capita obtained from the sample of 69 
countries with explicit deposit insurance as of year-end 2000. Multiple regression models were estimated to 
determine the influence of the political-institutional setup as well as other factors on the amount of coverage. It is 
found that political-institutional variables have little power in explaining variation in coverage level. Most of the 
variation can be explained by the share of risky banks in the system. Coverage is higher in countries where banks 
with relatively low capital-to-asset ratios constitute a larger share of the banking system.  The results suggest that 
private interests prevail over the public interests with regard to deposit insurance systems across the world. 
Therefore, from the welfare maximizing prospective, deposit insurance systems are not socially optimal in most of 
the countries. 
 
 Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005) updated the Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000) cross-
country deposit insurance database and extended it in several important dimensions. It identifies 14 new countries 
that have adopted deposit insurance since 1999 and identifies 12 other countries with deposit insurance as of 1999 
that were not covered before. It also provides an historical time series for several variables and adds new variables 
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such as the level of co-insurance requirements, percentage of the value of deposits covered, and the extent of 
coverage whether the protection is per depositor or per depositor per account 
 
Barth, Caprio, Levine (2007) analyze the impact of reforms in commercial bank regulatory regimes 
throughout the world. The examination of the latest data on bank regulation around the world doesn’t provide a 
uniformly positive view of recent reforms. Moreover, they conclude that even though many countries have followed 
the Basel guidelines, strengthening capital regulations and empowering supervisory agencies, the existing evidence 
does not suggest that this will improve banking system stability, enhance the efficiency of intermediation or reduce 
corruption in lending. 
 
 The following empirical analysis attempts to add to this literature by examining economic, demographic, 
political, and social factors as they relate to deposit insurance systems. In contrast to the previous literature, the 
analysis considers why a country provides insurance and how much is provided, in a sample selection framework. 
 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To examine the determinants of deposit insurance coverage, a model is estimated that relates the amount of 
coverage to various explanatory variables. However, since not all banking systems have explicit deposit insurance 
coverage, a sample selection problem exists. This causes the sample to be non-random, drawn from a subpopulation 
of a wider population. In our case only those banking systems with explicit deposit insurance coverage will have an 
observed amount of coverage. In order to avoid sample selection bias the two-step Heckman (1976) procedure will 
be used in the analysis.  
The resulting model is a two equation system with the first equation estimating the probability that an 
explicit deposit insurance system is in place. The second equation relates the amount of coverage to a set of 
explanatory variables, including a factor that accounts for selectivity.  
 
DEPINS = f
1
(

INCOME , 

PR , 

LIFEM , 

URBAN )           (Eq. 1) 
COV = f
2
(

INCOME ,
 /
RADJPREM ,
 /
DBAGDP ,
/
OVERHEAD ,             
 /
COINS ,
 /
ADMIN ,
 /
MEMBER ,
 /
REGUL ,
 /
FOREIGNC , )  (Eq. 2)                         
 
Table 1 describes all the variables included in equations, their definitions and sources. 
 
The rationale behind the Heckman procedure is that the error term is correlated with the explanatory 
variables in the first equation, causing bias asymptotically. Thus, the first stage of the Heckman procedure estimates 
the expected value of the error term and then it is included in the second equation as an extra variable, removing that 
part of the error which is correlated with the explanatory variables and thereby avoiding the bias.  
 
Therefore,   in equation (2) is the inverse Mill’s ratio from equation (1) accounting for sample selection 
bias. An alternative estimation approach is the maximum likelihood procedure, developed by Amemyia (1974). It is 
more efficient than the two-step approach, although the two-step approach is still widely used (Kennedy, 1998). 
 
Equation (1) is estimated using a probit equation for the entire sample, including all the countries with and 
without explicit deposit insurance. The dependent variable in the first equation, DEPINS, represents a deposit 
insurance dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the country has explicit insurance in place, and 0 otherwise. A country 
without explicit insurance may have either an implicit deposit insurance system in the form of unofficial agreements 
between government and banks or no deposit insurance.  Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2005) state that every 
country has a de facto implicit deposit insurance scheme in place.  The choice of independent variables included in 
the first equation is defined by various factors affecting the financial systems and banking sectors across countries. 
We include political, demographic and social characteristics that might affect the presence of an explicit deposit 
insurance system. Positive coefficients indicate a higher probability for a country to have explicit deposit insurance 
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while negative coefficients indicate a lower probability for a country to have explicit deposit insurance. INCOME is 
included as a measure of overall economic development. It is calculated as GDP per capita in 2003 US dollars. We 
expect a significant positive coefficient for INCOME which suggests that countries with higher levels of income are 
more likely to have an explicit deposit insurance system in place. The countries with a high level of income are 
mainly developed countries with developed banking industries and deposit insurance systems in place.  
 
 
Table 1:  List of Variables for Equation (1) and (2) 
Dependent Variables Definition Source 
DEPINS 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has explicit 
deposit insurance system in place 0 otherwise 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
COV 
coverage limits in US dollars, using the exchange rate 
at the end of June 2003 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
Independent Variables Definition Source 
INCOME 
 
level of income across countries, expressed as GDP 
per Capita in 2003 US dollars (2003) 
United nations, 2005 
PR 
political rights rating (average for December 1, 2003 
through November 30, 2004) 
United Nations, 2005 
LIFEM life expectancy for male population (2003) United Nations, 2005 
URBAN percentage of urban population (2003) United Nations, 2005 
RADJPREM Risk-adjusted premiums yes=1 no=0 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
DBAGDP Deposit Money Bank Assets / GDP 
The World Bank Dataset: A New 
Dataset on Financial Structure and 
Development 
OVERHEAD Bank Overhead Costs / Total Assets 
The World Bank Dataset: A New 
Dataset on Financial Structure and 
Development 
COINS Co-insurance yes=1 no=0 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
ADMINJ Administration  joint=1 otherwise=0 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
ADMINPR Administration private=1 otherwise =0 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
MEMBER Membership compulsory=1 voluntary=0 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
REGUL 
Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken 
legal action against bank directors or other bank 
officials?                       yes=1 no=0 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
FOREIGNC Foreign currencies yes=1 no=0 
The World Bank Dataset: Deposit 
Insurance Around the World, 2007 
 
 
The study by Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) implies that high deposit insurance limits are more feasible 
in countries with better institutional environments. Nowadays the political climate in a country, particularly political 
rights and civil liberties, is a subject of particular interest. Several indexes and ratings were created by different 
institutes which measure the degree of freedom in all the countries. PR is included to control for political regime in a 
country. PR is scaled from 1 to 7 with 1 representing the most free and 7 representing the least free rating for a 
country.  This freedom rating created by the United Nations reflects an overall judgment based on survey results. PR 
reflects global events from December 1, 2003, through November 30, 2004. We expect PR to be significant and 
negative, which implies that less free countries are less likely to have an explicit deposit insurance system.  
 
We also control for the effect of differences in demographics of the population. Life expectancy is one of 
the more important demographic characteristics. We include life expectancy for males. We expect LIFEM to have a 
significant positive coefficient, which in this case implies that countries with longer life expectancy are more likely 
to have explicit deposit insurance. The percentage of urban population is included to account for more demographic 
differences among countries. We expect URBAN to have a significant positive coefficient, which suggest that 
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countries with more people concentrated in cities or their suburbs are more likely to have an explicit deposit 
insurance system in place.  
 
Equation (2) is estimated using OLS for the sub sample of countries with explicit deposit insurance. The 
dependent variable for the second equation represents coverage limits as of 2003 in US dollars. The amount of 
coverage is an important feature since it directly affects market discipline. If the coverage is low, then depositors are 
more likely to monitor banking activities and therefore better and more reliable banks will be preferred by 
depositors. However, very high coverage limits could inhibit any form of monitoring on the depositors’ end, reduce 
market discipline, and result in moral hazard behavior by banks. The inverse Mill’s ratio (  ) from equation (1) is 
included to account for sample selection. Other independent variables include several deposit insurance design 
features as well as macroeconomic and financial variables.  
 
INCOME is the only variable which appears in both the first and second equations. In this context we 
expect the level of income to have a significant positive impact on the level of coverage. Countries with higher level 
of income and greater overall economic activity are more likely to have higher coverage limits.   
 
Premiums may be fixed or vary according to the riskiness of the underlying assets. RADJPREM is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the premiums are risk-adjusted or not. It is equal to one for risk-adjusted 
systems, and it is equal to zero for the systems with fixed premiums.  As of 1995, only the United States had a 
system with risk-adjusted premiums. Since then, the number of countries with risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
systems has gone up to 20. According to Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007) premiums are not risk-adjusted in the 
low-income category and it is also uncommon in other categories where some 23 percent of the countries employ 
this feature. RADJPREM has no a priori assumption about the sign of the coefficient. A statistically significant 
positive coefficient will imply that countries with this design feature in place provide higher coverage limits, 
therefore implementing risk-adjusted premiums reduce moral hazard and prevent banks from excessive risk taking. 
On the other hand, statistically significant negative coefficient supports the fact that countries with risk-adjusted 
premiums have lower coverage limits, and therefore identifies more conservative deposit insurance systems in place.  
 
DBAGDP presents a measure of the size of a country’s banking sector relative to GDP. This measure gives 
evidence of the importance of the financial services performed by the banking sector relative to the size of the 
economy. The assets include claims on the nonfinancial real sector, including both public and private sectors.  A 
large amount of deposit money bank assets as a percentage of GDP implies that banks play a more important role in 
the financial system. Conversely a small amount of deposit money bank assets as a percentage of GDP implies that 
banks play a less important role and the financial system is more capital market oriented. Therefore, a significant 
positive coefficient suggests that the more influence the banks possess, the higher the level of deposit insurance 
coverage limits. A significant negative coefficient suggests that the more influence the banks possess, the lower 
deposit insurance coverage limits. Due to these two possible outcomes, no a priori assumption is made about the 
DBAGDP coefficient.  
 
One of the main functions of financial intermediaries is to channel funds from savers to investors. 
OVERHEAD is included as a potential efficiency measure that describes how well banks perform this function. 
OVERHEAD is equal to the accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as share of its total assets. The higher 
value of overhead costs identifies less efficient banks. Therefore, a significant negative coefficient suggests 
enforcement of market discipline through deposit insurance since less efficient banking systems with higher 
overhead are provided less coverage.  In contrast, if systems with high overhead and less efficient banks also have 
higher coverage levels, then the coefficient would be positive.  Here, deposit insurance coverage would be 
subsidizing an inefficient banking sector.  No assumption is made about this relationship so the sign off the 
OVERHEAD coefficient is ambiguous.  
 
The remaining variables COINS, ADMIN, MEMBER, REGUL, and FOREIGNC are included in the model 
to account for differences in explicit deposit insurance system design features.  The COINS variable provides 
information on whether the program requires depositor co-insurance (a deductible). In addition to setting a 
maximum level of coverage, some countries have incorporated co-insurance into their deposit insurance systems. 
With co-insurance, a fraction of the covered amount is insured so the depositor is exposed to some of the risk of 
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loss.  Thus, it is aimed to get depositors to make more prudent bank choices in their deposit decisions, since 
depositors bear part of the cost in the event of a bank failure. It is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a co-
insurance mechanism is in place, and it is equal to zero if this feature is absent. Table 5 presents a list of countries 
that have implemented co-insurance in their explicit deposit insurance schemes.  Co-insurance was required by 
about a third of the countries, does not exist in low-income countries but otherwise gets more and more prevalent in 
the higher income level countries. No a priori assumption is made about the sign of the COINS variable coefficient. 
A significant positive coefficient suggests that countries with co-insurance in place provide higher coverage limits. 
A significant negative coefficient suggests that countries with co-insurance reinforce market discipline with lower 
coverage limits in addition to other bank regulation.   
 
We create two dummy variables ADMINJ and ADMINPR to account for administration forms of the 
systems that can be broken into three main categories: official, joint, and private administration. Systems that are 
administered by central banks are included in the official administration category. Moreover, some privately 
administered institutions have limited authorities. For example, in Italy and Croatia certain decisions need to go 
through the central bank for approval, hence the deposit insurance systems of these countries are considered to have 
a joint administration in the database. ADMINJ is equal to one if a country has a joint form of administration and 
zero otherwise. ADMINPR is equal to one if a country has a private form of administration.  The coefficient signs 
for both dummy variable are ambiguous since a statistically significant positive sign will suggest that private or joint 
form of administration, compared to official administration, offsets market discipline through higher coverage limits 
while a statistically significant negative coefficient will suggest that private or joint form of administration, 
compared to official administration, reinforces market discipline through lower coverage limits and implements 
regulation policies toward more stable banking systems. The schemes are mostly administered officially (60%), 
followed by joint administration (26%). Private administration is highest in the high income category.  
 
MEMBER is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the membership to the fund is compulsory and 
zero it is voluntary. If systems with required membership also have higher coverage, then this coefficient would be 
positive.  A negative coefficient would imply the opposite.  No assumption is made about the sign of MEMBER.  
Membership is compulsory in 90 percent of the countries. The only exception is the Asia and Pacific Region, where 
half of the group has voluntary membership.  
 
REGUL is constructed based on the deposit insurance related survey results from the Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2004) database on banking regulation and supervision. REGUL is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the deposit insurance fund can take legal action against bank directors or other bank officials, and zero otherwise. 
No a priori assumption is made about the sign of the coefficient on REGUL. A positive coefficient would imply 
higher coverage in systems with more accountability for bank officials.  A negative coefficient would suggest the 
opposite.   
 
FOREIGNC is a dummy variable that is equal to one for systems that cover foreign currency denominated 
deposits, and zero otherwise. However, some deposit insurance systems are restrictive in the set of foreign 
currencies they cover. For instance, Hungary extends coverage to deposits denominated in EUR or currencies of 
other OECD countries. This variable takes a value of one for such countries as well. If a country covers foreign 
currency deposits, deposit insurance could incur larger losses in the case of bank failures. Therefore, a statistically 
significant positive coefficient suggests more generous deposit insurance schemes within a more liberal 
environment, while a statistically significant negative coefficient suggests less generous deposit insurance as an 
attempt to limit potential losses. Foreign currency deposit coverage is found in 76 percent of the countries, whereas 
it is observed in 57 percent of the low-income countries. This feature will be more likely to be in place in developed 
countries as a result of more developed banking infrastructure and financial systems in general. However, more and 
more developing countries are adopting this feature as a result of high volatility of the value of national currencies.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 Table 2 represents summary statistics for equation (1) and equation (2). Equation (1) and (2) were 
estimated using Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation procedure.  Table 3 presents the regression results for the 
estimated probit equation by maximum likelihood. The total number of 178 observations was employed to obtain 
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estimation results. An intercept was included in the model and was statistically significant at a 1 percent significance 
level.  INCOME is statistically insignificant. First this result might be surprising since we assumed that countries 
with high income are more likely to have explicit deposit insurance systems in place. However, according to 
Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005), as of 2003 there are 30 high income countries, 17 upper middle 
income countries, 30 lower middle income countries, and 10 low income countries. Until the 1990s a surge of 
explicit deposit insurance systems prevailed in high income countries, but since 1995 we observe a surge in explicit 
deposit insurance systems among lower middle income countries. This is partly driven by the Eastern and Central 
European transition economies as well as former Soviet Union republics. PR turns out to be statistically significant 
at a 5% significance level and it also has the expected negative sign. The more democratic countries are more likely 
to have an explicit deposit insurance system. LIFEM is statistically significant at a 1% significance level with 
expected positive coefficient. The countries with longer male life expectancy are more likely to have an explicit 
deposit insurance system, while countries with shorter male life expectancy tend to be less likely to have explicit 
deposit insurance systems. Therefore, the results are consistent with our expectations. URBAN is statistically 
insignificant and therefore the percentage of urban population doesn’t have a significant impact whether an explicit 
deposit insurance system is in place or not. 
 
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
 
Dependent Variables N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
DEPINS 178 .5138 .5012 0 1 
COV 50 26837.85 46670.03 588 100,000 
Independent Variables N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
INCOME 
(equation 1) 
178 7322.69 11,546.54 86 57,379 
INCOME 
(equation 2) 
50 16,169.11 14,453.42 390 43,486 
PR 164 3.44 2.19 1 7 
LIFEM 164 63.19 11.76 32.5 78.7 
URBAN 164 55.07 23.36 2 100 
RADJPREM 50 .26 .44 0 1 
DBAGDP 50 .67 .45 .12 1.74 
OVERHEAD 50 .35E-01 .18E-01 .92E-02 .79E-01 
COINS 50 .34 .48 0 1 
ADMINJ 50 .32 .47 0 1 
ADMINPR 50 .18 .39 0 1 
MEMBER 50 .94 .24 0 1 
REGUL 50 .3 .46 0 1 
FOREIGNC 50 .78 .42 0 1 
 
 
Table 3:  Probit Equation Results (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Variable Coefficients 
INTERCEPT 
-2.387*** 
(.8059) 
INCOME 
0.742D-05 
(.1374D-04) 
PR 
-0.136** 
(.0540) 
LIFEM 
.038*** 
(.0133) 
URBAN 
0.007 
(.0060) 
*** significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
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Table 4 gives results for the OLS equation (2). The standard errors were computed using Murphy and 
Topel (1985) results for two-step estimators. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent. The total number of 
observations is 50, while the total number of countries with an explicit deposit insurance system is 87. Table 5 
represents a sample of countries employed in equation (2). The data sources are indicated in Table 1.  Data 
collection was performed through surveys conducted by the World Bank, however some countries did not respond to 
surveys or provided inaccurate and conflicting information. Therefore, the number of observations in the second 
equation dramatically falls due to lack of complete and comprehensive information on countries with explicit 
deposit insurance.  
 
 
Table 4:  OLS Equation Results (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Variable Coefficients 
INTERCEPT 
48989.24 
(37967.1486) 
INCOME 
2.05*** 
(.7146) 
RADJPREM 
-13582.76 
(12474.3088) 
DBAGDP 
-58703.67*** 
(21128.06) 
OVERHEAD 
-750170.15* 
(389608.59) 
COINS 
-24010.24** 
(11149.90) 
ADMINJ 
11679.12 
(11863.9451) 
ADMINPR 
34035.73* 
(18502.1329) 
MEMBER 
21837.22 
(22233.1629) 
REGUL 
303.73 
(11297.69) 
FOREIGNC 
3819.69 
(12885.28) 
  
-8559.12 
(26157.5461) 
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent 
*** significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
 
The intercept and the inverse Mills’ ratio from equation (1) were included to account for sample selection. 
However, the results turn out to be that both the intercept and inverse Mills’ ratio are statistically insignificant
1
. INCOME is statistically significant at a 1% significance level with anticipated positive sign. Therefore, countries 
with a higher level of income have a higher coverage limit. RADJPREM is statistically insignificant, meaning that 
the amount of coverage is unrelated to the manner in which premiums are levied. This result can be explained by the 
fact that deposit insurance is largely underpriced in most countries. It coincides with empirical findings by Cull, 
Senbet, and Sorge (2005) that deposit insurance premiums are often so low that they are ineffective at constraining 
banks’ risk-taking incentives. DBAGDP is statistically significant at a 1% significance level with a negative 
coefficient. In the context of this study it indicates that countries with bank-based financial systems and a high ratio 
of total bank assets to GDP tend to have lower coverage limits. Conversely, countries with capital market-based 
financial systems and a low ratio of total assets to GDP tend to have higher coverage limits. Therefore, lower 
coverage limits reduce insurance fund risk exposure in countries with relatively large banking systems. 
OVERHEAD is statistically significant at a 10% significance level with a negative coefficient. Countries with 
inefficient banking systems or high overhead costs as a share of its total assets have less generous deposit insurance 
schemes. Overall it indicates enforcement of market discipline through deposit insurance programs and presence of 
more conservative bank regulation. COINS is statistically significant at a 5% significance level with a negative 
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coefficient. Countries that have implemented co-insurance features into their deposit insurance scheme provide 
lower coverage, reinforcing market discipline.  Multicollinearity between RADJPREM and COINS was checked and 
found not to be an issue in this case.  
 
 
Table 5:  List of Countries with an Explicit Deposit Insurance 
 
High income countries (30) 
Austria 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Belgium 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Isle of Man 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Upper middle income countries (17) 
Argentina 
Chile 
Croatia 
Czech Rep 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Oman 
Poland 
Slovak Republic 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Lower middle income countries (30) 
Albania 
Algeria 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Colombia 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Macedonia 
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Serbia Montenegro 
Sri Lanka 
Thiland 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Lower income countries (10) 
Bangladesh 
India 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Vietnam 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
ADMINPR is statistically significant at a 10% significance level with a positive coefficient. Thus, countries 
with privately administered institutions provide higher coverage limits and constitute more generous deposit 
insurance schemes, compared to countries with officially administered systems. In this case private administration 
offsets market discipline through higher coverage limits. Since privately administered systems lack the backing of 
the public sector and its ability to raise funds through the tax system, higher coverage limits substitute for public 
sector control. The other variables explaining various design features of deposit insurance schemes are found to be 
statistically insignificant.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper attempts to add to the short list of empirical work on deposit insurance systems throughout the 
world. The data collected in the past years make it possible to perform empirical analysis and expand the theoretical 
literature on this issue.  Using cross-country data we first investigate which factors have a significant effect on the 
presence of an explicit deposit insurance system. The findings of this study allow us to conclude that country 
demographics such as life expectancy have a significant effect on whether explicit deposit insurance is adopted or 
not. Countries with longer life expectancy are more likely to have an explicit deposit insurance system in place. 
Moreover, human rights particularly political rights, contribute to the presence of an explicit deposit insurance 
system.  The more free countries in terms of political rights are more likely to have an explicit deposit insurance 
system.  
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For the countries which have already implemented an explicit deposit insurance system the main task is to 
create an effective safety-net. As we can see coverage levels, design features, schemes and main characteristics vary 
widely across countries. On one hand policy makers’ goal is to protect depositors and prevent bank crisis, however 
generous protection of banks may easily introduce risk-enhancing moral hazard, and destabilize the system it is 
meant to protect. The amount of coverage is one of the key features of deposit insurance systems. We investigate the 
impact of various factors including demographic, social, economic, financial, and political variables on the level of 
coverage provided by deposit insurance systems throughout the world.  We find that the level of income has a 
significant impact on deposit insurance systems. Countries with a higher level of income tend to have a higher 
coverage limit. The value of bank assets relative to GDP, emphasizing the importance and the dominance of the 
banking sector within financial system, has an effect on the amount of coverage. Countries with bank based financial 
systems have lower coverage limits compare to countries with capital market based financial systems. Therefore, 
this result supports the view that bigger banking systems imply larger exposure to possible losses. Thus low 
coverage levels reduce overall insurance fund risk. Different design features present policy makers with an 
important trade-off between depositor safety and bank risk taking. We find that countries with more inefficient 
systems, as measured by overhead expenses, have lower coverage limits.  Similarly, systems incorporating some 
form of coinsurance or deductibles for depositors have lower limits.   They reinforce and strengthen market 
discipline with lower coverage in addition to other regulation. Countries with private administration introduce more 
generous deposit insurance schemes. According to Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2003) the introduction of generous 
deposit insurance schemes in countries lacking adequate bank supervision and rule of law might not help but rather 
appear an obstacle for financial system stability and development.  
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End Notes 
 
1 Despite the insignificance of the inverse Mills’ ratio, it remains in the model. It is unlikely that the final sample reflects a 
random draw from the initial sample of 178 countries, so removing the inverse Mills’ ratio from the model would result in 
omitted variable bias. For comparison, equation (2) was re-estimated without the inverse Mills’ ratio. Although the magnitude of 
the coefficients changed, signs and significance levels are similar to the results in Table 4. 
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